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Denghua Zhang
Concessional loans account for more than half of Chinese 
foreign aid (China State Council 2014) and are currently in the 
spotlight. The Trump Administration’s Indo-Pacific strategy 
targets infrastructure projects funded by Chinese concessional 
loans in developing countries and pledges to compete 
with China by providing high-standard infrastructure that is 
‘physically secure, financially viable and socially responsible’ 
(Pompeo 2018). On the eve of the Forty-ninth Pacific Islands 
Forum, Tongan Prime Minister ‘Akilisi Pohiva intended to urge 
Pacific nations to band together and press Beijing to forgive 
debts associated with Chinese concessional loans, although 
he backed down at the last minute. Chinese loan schemes 
have also sparked intense debates on debt risks and the Belt 
and Road Initiative. 
Against this backdrop, the nature and ramifications of 
Chinese loans schemes are examined in this two-part series. 
Part 1 outlines the nature of Chinese concessional loan 
schemes and identifies three common misperceptions. Part 2 
investigates Pacific indebtedness:  the possibility of debt-for-
equity deals and what happens when repayments no longer 
occur.
First misperception:  People can easily conflate different 
types of Chinese financing, viewing all of them as foreign aid. 
Only grants, and interest-free and concessional loans are 
calculated as Chinese foreign aid. Various types of finance are 
provided by China’s three policy banks — the Export-Import 
Bank of China (China Exim Bank), China Development Bank 
and the Agricultural Development Bank of China. Set up in 
1994 by the Chinese government, these policy banks are 
largely responsible for raising funds and providing loans to 
support Chinese contractors to carry out large infrastructure 
projects overseas (see Table 1). As an example of a commercial 
loan, in November 2014, the Chinese government pledged to 
set up a special fund of US$1 billion from China Development 
Bank to support infrastructure development in the Pacific, 
though details of implementation remain inaccessible.
Second misperception:  Some people may think Chinese 
concessional loans can be written off when recipient countries 
lack repayment capacity. These differ from interest-free loans 
which are often forgiven by Beijing in high-profile cases,1 
because both the principal and interest of concessional loans 
are required to be repaid. 
Table 1:  Chinese foreign aid 
Type of 
finance
Chinese 
foreign 
aid?
Comments
Grants √
Interest-free 
loans
√ Can be forgiven.
Concessional 
loans
√
See 
details 
below
China Exim Bank 
• interest rate 2% to 3%
• 15 to 20 repayment years, 
including 5 to 7 years’ grace
• must be repaid.
Examples: 
i. University of Goroka dormitory construction (2011–14); 
phases 2 to 4, US$45.9 million (RMB 294 million), China’s 
first concessional loan project in Papua New Guinea. 
ii. Reconstruction of central business district in Nuku‘alofa, 
Tonga (2008–12), US$68.7 million (RMB 440 million).
Commercial 
loan schemes
X i. China Exim Bank
ii. China Development Bank
iii. Agricultural Development Bank 
of China.
i. Export buyers’ credits.
ii. China–Africa Development Fund, the Special Loan for 
the Development of African Small and Medium-sized 
Enterprises, Fund for Development Cooperation between 
China and Portuguese-speaking Countries, Special Fund 
for Infrastructure Development in Pacific Island countries 
et cetera.
iii. Loans to support large overseas agricultural projects.
Governments of developing countries are interested in 
Chinese concessional loans for four reasons:
1. Demand for external funds to promote economic and social 
development. For example, infrastructure investment needs 
in Asia over between 2016 and 2030 are estimated to be 
US$1.7 trillion per annum while the current investment level 
is US$881 billion (ADB 2017, p. xi), leaving a huge gap of 
US$811.9 billion. 
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2. Compared with funds from traditional donors and 
international financial institutions, Chinese concessional 
loans appeal to recipient governments because fewer 
conditions are attached to them (e.g. democratic, 
governance, human rights and financial reform) and a faster 
approval process.
3. Chinese contractors, especially the state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs), bid for infrastructure projects in recipient countries 
at competitive prices. They can easily access Chinese 
concessional loans to implement these projects. However, 
these can be subject to fraudulent practices — some 
Chinese contractors may intentionally bid lower prices and 
then keep pressing recipient governments to increase the 
budget after they win the contract (Chinese government 
Procurement Network 2016), which pushes up the project 
cost and contributes to rising debts. For example, China 
Communication Construction Corporation and all its 
subsidies, including China Harbour Engineering Company, 
were blacklisted by the World Bank until January 2017 
for fraud in a Philippines roads project. CHEC, an active 
player in the Pacific infrastructure sector, has also been 
heavily criticised by some Pacific politicians,2 Pacific media 
and even Chinese peer contractors (author’s interview, 
November 2014). 
4. Misconception of Chinese concessional loans:  some 
officials in recipient countries may assume they can request 
Beijing to forgive mature loans , or turn loans into interest-free 
loans and ultimately write them off; other officials may be 
aware of the difficulties in writing off concessional loans, but 
still hope China may do so for the sake of bilateral political 
relations, neither of which is correct.   
China is fond of providing concessional loans for three 
reasons. First, compared with grants and interest-free loans, 
concessional loans must be repaid, which reduces the financial 
burden of the Chinese government, especially as demands for 
Chinese aid are steadily growing. Second, as required by the 
concessional loans agreement, Chinese contractors, especially 
SOEs, will be awarded the contracts to implement loan 
projects. In this sense, concessional loans play a significant 
role in supporting Chinese companies’ zou chuqu zhanlue 
(‘going out strategy’) to explore overseas markets, create 
their brands and access natural resources and energy to fuel 
China’s economic development. Third, Chinese concessional 
loan projects provide job opportunities for Chinese workers and 
generate revenue for Beijing. This point is of more relevance 
when China is offshoring excess manufacturing capacity. It 
also explains why these loan projects use a large proportion of 
Chinese labour, equipment and building materials.  
Third misperception:  Chinese aid calculation can also 
be frustrating. Chinese concessional loan funds are raised 
by China Exim Bank from the capital market at a commercial 
interest rate and are then lent to recipient countries as Chinese 
aid at a concessional interest rate. The difference between 
the two rates is covered by the Chinese foreign aid budget and 
reimbursed by the government; however, the full face value of 
concessional loans is calculated as Chinese foreign aid. While 
traditional donors (e.g. members of the OECD Development 
Assistance Committee) deduct loan repayments from their 
official development assistance amount, referred to as net ODA, 
Beijing does not use this indicator of net foreign aid, which 
means China will not net off repayment of its concessional 
loans in its aid calculations. Furthermore, some traditional 
donors, such as the United States of America and Australia, 
include grant aid only in their ODAs. By contrast, concessional 
loans have become the largest component of Chinese aid and 
that proportion continues to grow. These differences demand 
attention when discussing traditional ODA and Chinese foreign 
aid to avoid the risk of comparing apples and oranges.
Summary
Chinese foreign aid includes concessional loans but excludes 
commercial loans. Concessional loans are required to be repaid. 
Both China and recipient countries need to carefully consider 
the repayment capacity of Pacific Island countries before loans 
are granted. Part 2 of this series on Chinese concessional loans 
examines non-payment of loans and the possible repercussions 
for PICs, as revealed by recent research.
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Endnotes
1. For example, President Xi Jinping announced at the United 
Nations in September 2015 that China would write off 
outstanding interest-free loans due by the end of 2015 owed 
by relevant least-developed countries, landlocked developing 
countries and small island developing countries.
2. The Lae Port development is CHEC’s first project in PNG. 
CHEC claimed it was a great success but this was discounted 
by Don Pomb Polye, Leader of the PNG Opposition, as a 
failure. Main project funder ADB acknowledged that design 
changes had led to an additional cost of US$137 million.
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